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Social Media Thoughtcrimes
Daniel S. Harawa*
I.

Introduction

“Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to
tears of both joy and sorrow, and . . . inflict great pain.”
-John G. Roberts, Chief Justice of the United States1
The Supreme Court has “long recognized that each
medium of expression presents special First Amendment
problems.”2
Social media has proved this statement
exceedingly accurate. Social media has created a new frontier
of constitutional issues, exacerbating the difficulty in defining
the boundaries between free expression and criminal acts.
Social media is a necessary part of modern interaction.
And although Facebook, widely considered the leader of the
social media pack,3 was created just for college students, social
media is no longer exclusively for the youth. As such, 73% of
online adults use social media sites,4 56% of all Americans have
at least one social media profile,5 and the average age of
Facebook users is most rapidly increasing in the 45-to-54 year-

* J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; B.A., University of
Richmond. I am grateful to Professor Leslie Garfield, the participants in the
Pace Law Review Social Justice Social Media Symposium, and the Pace Law
Review editors for their insightful comments, conversations, and feedback.
1. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011) (emphasis added).
2. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (citation omitted).
3. The History of Social Networking, DIGITAL TRENDS (Aug. 5, 2014),
http://www.digitaltrends.com/features/the-history-of-socialnetworking/#!OMCd2.
4. Maeve Duggan & Aaron Smith, Social Media Update 2013, PEW RES.
INTERNET PROJECT (Dec. 30, 2013),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/12/30/social-media-update-2013/.
5. Jay Baer, 11 Shocking New Social Media Statistics in America,
CONVINCE & CONVERT DIGITAL MKTG. ADVISORS (May 19, 2014),
http://www.convinceandconvert.com/social-media-research/11-shocking-newsocial-media-statistics-in-america/.
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old age bracket.6
Social media has become integral to
connecting people around the world. But in an age where
people are able post a steady stream of consciousness in 140
characters or less, and can constantly take pictures in order to
walk their followers visually through their day, broader
implications concerning both criminal law and constitutional
law loom. How will the burgeoning use of social media impact
America’s laws? Does the Constitution protect people’s tweets,
Facebook posts, instapics, and other online social interactions?7
Can social media activity expose the average American to
criminal liability?
These questions are brought into even sharper focus when
one considers the ways in which the government and private
entities monitor social media sites. Sites such as Facebook,
Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, and LinkedIn make no bones
about the fact that users who post information on these
websites have no expectation of privacy or exclusivity in that
information.8 And this fact, in the wake of constant BigBrother-like revelations of government Internet search
capabilities,9 raises real concern as to how people use, and the
government polices, social media.10
The First Amendment to the Constitution trumpets
6. Cooper Smith, 7 Statistics About Facebook Users that Reveal Why It’s
Such a Powerful Marketing Platform, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 16, 2013, 8:00AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/a-primer-on-facebook-demographics-2013-10.
7. See generally Brandon Griggs, When is social-media use a crime?,
CNN
TECH
(Dec.
19,
2012,
5:41AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/18/tech/social-media/newtown-social-mediacrime.
8. See, e.g., Social Networking Privacy, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR. (May 7,
2014), http://epic.org/privacy/socialnet/.
9. See, e.g., Associated Press, Everyone is Under Surveillance Now, Says
Whistleblower Edward Snowden, THE GUARDIAN (May 3, 2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/03/everyone-is-undersurveillance-now-says-whistleblower-edward-snowden;
Editorial
Board,
Edward Snowden, Whistle-Blower, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/02/opinion/edward-snowden-whistleblower.html?_r=0; James Risen & Laura Poitras, N.S.A. Collecting Millions
of
Faces
from
Web
Images,
N.Y. TIMES,
May
31,
2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/01/us/nsa-collecting-millions-of-faces-fromweb-images.html?ref=us.
10. See Justin P. Murray & Adrian Fontecilla, Social Media Evidence in
Government Investigations and Criminal Proceedings: A Frontier of New
Legal Issues, 19 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 11 (2013).
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“Congress shall make no laws . . . abridging the freedom of
speech.”11 While there has always been tension as to where to
draw the line between free expression and criminal acts, in the
age of social media this tension is unprecedented. As such,
there is a need to revisit the way we protect and criminalize
online speech.12 Antiquated notions of freedom of speech and
outmoded First Amendment doctrine do not suffice in an age
where private thoughts and conversations are more often than
not broadcasted in a public sphere. Obviously, the Framers of
the Bill of Rights did not fully anticipate the advent of the
Internet and the social media explosion.
Moreover, in
developing First Amendment protections, the Supreme Court
could not adequately forecast how integral the Internet and
social media would become to everyday life.13
As people live out their lives online, what is protected
expression and what is criminal speech? This article begins to
explore this fine distinction, and advocates for a shift in the
way online speech is protected vis-à-vis the First Amendment.
Part I provides examples of criminalized social media activity
and explores why people seemingly treat online speech as
private communications.
Part II looks at existing
jurisprudence regarding the criminalization of speech and First
Amendment protections. And Part III attempts to determine
where to draw the line by advocating for a return to simpler
times in First Amendment jurisprudence.
II.

The Thought Police

“1984 may have come a bit later than predicted, but it’s
here at last.”14
People around the world have been arrested for their social
11. U.S. CONST. amend I.
12. See, e.g., Leslie Yalof Garfield, The Death of Slander, 35 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 1 (2011).
13. The Supreme Court did not discuss the regulation of materials
distributed via the Internet and free speech until 1997. See Reno v. ACLU,
521 U.S. 844 (1997).
14. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1121 (9th Cir. 2010)
(Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc.) (emphasis
added).
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media use. For example, Turkish authorities arrested dozens
of protestors for inciting anti-government sentiments over
Twitter,15 a group of men was arrested for creating a Facebook
page allegedly slandering President Sleiman of Lebanon, 16 a
man in Canada was arrested for harassing someone over
Twitter,17 and an English teen was arrested for posting
abhorrent comments about a recently murdered girl on
Facebook.18 In the United States, however, arresting people for
their social media activity alone once seemed a far-fetched
proposition.19 As a result, popular media and legal scholarly
discourse paid closer attention to social media’s impact on
other aspects of life, including how it has changed workplace
harassment,20 whether student online speech can be
regulated,21 the relatively new phenomena of cyber-bullying
and sexting,22 and social media’s evolving role in sex crimes
15. Luke Harding & Constanze Letsch, Turkish Police Arrest 25 People
for Using Social Media to Call for Protest, THE GUARDIAN (June 5, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/05/turkish-police-arrests-socialmedia-protest.
16. Adrian Blomfield, Man Arrested for ‘Insulting Lebanese President on
Facebook’,
THE
TELEGRAPH
(July
28,
2010),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/lebanon/7914474/Ma
n-arrested-for-insulting-Lebanese-president-on-Facebook.html.
17. Kim Magi, Man Charged with Harassment after Twitter Attacks,
THESTAR.COM
(Nov.
21,
2012),
http://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2012/11/21/man_charged_with_harassment
_after_twitter_attacks.html.
18. Press Association, April Jones Murder: Teenager Jailed Over
Offensive
Facebook
Posts,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
8,
2012),
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/oct/08/april-jones-teenager-jailedfacebook?newsfeed=true.
19. See infra Part I.A.
20. See, e.g., Jeremy Gelms, High-Tech Harassment: Employer Liability
Under Title VII for Employee Social Media Misconduct, 87 WASH. L. REV. 249
(2012).
21. Michael W. Macleod-Ball, Student Speech Online: Too Young to
Exercise the Right to Free Speech?, 7 I/S J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 101
(2011).
22. See, e.g., Heather Benzmiller, Note & Comment, The CyberSamaritans: Exploring Criminal Liability for the “Innocent” Bystanders of
Cyberbullying, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 927 (2013); Jamie L. Williams, Note,
Teens, Sexts, & Cyberspace: The Constitutional Implications of Current
Sexting & Cyberbullying Laws, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1017 (2012);
Allison V. King, Note, Constitutionality of Cyberbullying Laws: Keeping the
Online Playground Safe for Both Teens and Free Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 845
(2010).
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and child abuse.23
It is time to refocus discourse on social media to
understand how it aligns with First Amendment rights and
basic criminal law principles as American arrests for social
media activity are becoming increasingly commonplace. People
are no longer only being prosecuted for online speech that is
inherently criminal, such as fraud or defamation,24 or social
media activity depicting evidence of a crime that has been
committed, such as the man who posted a picture of his dead
wife on Facebook.25 Americans are being placed in the criminal
justice system for posting thoughts that express criminal ideas
— words that foreshadow a criminal event with no other action
in furtherance of the crime — what I call social media
thoughtcrime.26 Criminalizing thoughts, even when posted
online, pose serious problems given that speech should be by
default protected by the First Amendment, subject to
(supposedly) narrow exceptions.
The Orwellian tenor may seem hyperbolic, but one just
23. See, e.g., Eva Conner, Comment, Why Don’t You Take a Seat Away
from That Computer?: Why Louisiana Revised State 14:91.5 Is
Unconstitutional, 73 LA. L. REV. 883 (2013).
24. See Garfield, supra note 12.
25. See Snejana Farberov, Man Who Shot Dead His Wife Then Posted
‘RIP’ Picture of Her Corpse on Facebook Page Played a Gun-Toting Gang
Member in TV Series and Has Dreams of Fame, DAILYMAIL.COM (Aug. 6,
2013),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2387305/Derek-MedinaFlorida-man-posts-picture-dead-wife-Jennifer-Alfonso-Facebook.html.
26. This phrase was used by George Orwell in his famous novel on
dystopian society, 1984. To explore this question, it is important to underline
what is not being explored. This article does not explore the many issues
that arise as a result of government social media monitoring. See, e.g., April
Warren, Law Enforcement Increasingly Turning to Social Media, OCALA STAR
BANNER,
May
30,
2013,
http://www.ocala.com/article/20130530/ARTICLES/130539959. Likewise, it
does not address private monitoring and social media sites turning over
users’ information to assist with government investigations. See, e.g.,
Mallory Allen & Aaron Orheim, Get Outta My Face[book]: The Discoverability
of Social Networking Data and the Passwords Needed to Access Them, 8
WASH. J. L. TECH. & ARTS 137 (2012). Nor does it focus on the use of social
media in criminal prosecutions. See, e.g., Ken Strutin, Social Media and
Vanishing Points of Ethical and Constitutional Boundaries, 31 PACE L. REV.
228 (2011). Finally, it takes no position on the criminalization of direct
threats sent over social media platforms. These are all important issues
implicated by the question explored herein that are worthy of further
discussion, but largely outside the scope of this article.
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need turn on the news to see this very issue played out in real
time. Tweeters and Facebook users have been arrested for
sharing their thoughts, ideas, and crude senses of humor.
What once seemed a fantastical parade of horribles is now a
reality; this past year alone has demonstrated that Americans
can, and are arrested for their social media activity.
A. Kids Being Kids?
1. Justin Carter
Perhaps the most famous story of a social media inspired
arrest is the story of Justin Carter. During an online exchange
while playing the game League of Legends, then-eighteen-yearold Justin Carter posted on Facebook an allegedly sarcastic
comment about how he was going to “shoot up a
kindergarten.”27 Justin made the comment at an extremely
sensitive time — two months after the Sandy Hook Elementary
School shooting.28 Another Facebook user saw the comment
and reported it to authorities.29 Justin was arrested and
charged with the felony of making a terrorist threat.30 Justin’s
case has received widespread media attention and generated
public outcry, with over 100,000 people petitioning for his
release.31 Justin’s case got so much attention that an
anonymous donor posted his $500,000 bond.32 Justin is
currently awaiting trial, and is facing up to eight years in
prison.33

27. Brandon Griggs, Teen jailed for Facebook ‘joke’ is Released, CNN
(July 13, 2013,
8:42
AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/12/tech/socialmedia/facebook-jailed-teen/.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Suzanne Choney, Petition to Free Jailed Facebook Teen Reaches
100,000
Signatures,
TODAY
(July
9,
2013,
7:11PM),
http://www.today.com/money/petition-free-jailed-facebook-teen-reaches-100000-signatures-6C10584678.
32. Id.
33. Andrew Delgado & Rogello Mares, Trial Continues for New
Braunfels Teen Accused of Making Facebook Threats, KENS5.COM (Mar. 27,
2014), http://www.kens5.com/videos/news/local/2014/06/27/10675082/.
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While Justin’s story garnered the most public attention, he
is not the only person recently arrested for their social media
activities.

2. Chicago Teenager
A fifteen-year-old teenager was arrested in Chicago and
charged with a felony for tweeting he would commit “mass
homicide” if George Zimmerman was found not guilty in the
killing of Trayvon Martin.34 Although the police recognized the
teen did not possess any weapons nor did he pose a credible
threat, police still charged him with felony disorderly conduct.35
3. Cameron D’Ambrosio
Cameron D’Ambrosio, a Massachusetts high school
student, was arrested and charged with communicating
terroristic threats for posting this rap lyric on Facebook: “fuck
a boston bombinb [sic] wait till u see the shit I do, I’ma be
famous rapping, and beat every murder charge that comes
across me!”36 The teen got off lightly, however, when the grand
jury refused to indict him, requiring his release.37
4. Leigh Van Bryan & Emily Bunting
Two British tourists were arrested and detained for over
twelve hours at the Los Angeles airport for their Twitter
34. Nicholas Demas, 8 Social Media Users Arrested for What They Said
Online,
POLICY
MIC
(July
17,
2013),
http://www.policymic.com/articles/54961/8-social-media-users-arrested-forwhat-they-said-online.
35. Hunter Stuart, Teen Charged With Felony After Threatening ‘Mass
Homicide’ If Zimmerman Acquitted, HUFFINGTON POST (July 15, 2013, 10:34
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/15/mass-homicidezimmerman_n_3599238.html.
36. John Knefel, Grand Jury Rejects Indictment of Teen Arrested for Rap
Lyrics,
ROLLING
STONE
(June
6,
2013),
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/grand-jury-rejects-indictment-ofteen-arrested-for-rap-lyrics-20130606.
37. Id.
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activity.38 Leigh Van Bryan was arrested for tweeting “Free
this week, for quick gossip/prep before I go and destroy
America?”39 Little did Department of Homeland Security know
that “destroy” is British slang for party.40 Homeland Security
also detained and questioned Leigh’s companion Emily
Bunting, in part for her quoting popular American sitcom
Family Guy, tweeting, “3 weeks today, we’re totally in LA
[pissing] people off on Hollywood Blvd and diggin’ Marilyn
Monroe up!”41
5. “Sarah,” the Dutch Teenager
Most recently, a Dutch teenager identified as “Sarah,”
tweeted to American Airlines: “@AmericanAir hello my name’s
Ibrahim and I’m from Afghanistan. I’m a part of Al Qaida and
on June 1st I’m gonna do something really big bye[.]”42
American Airlines responded, telling Sarah, “we take these
threats very seriously. Your IP address and details will be
forwarded to security and the FBI.”43 Sarah then attempted to
double-back on her original tweet, saying that she was “stupid”
and “scared,” at one point saying her friend was responsible for
the tweet.44 The recantations were not enough, however, as
Sarah later turned herself over to the Rotterdam police for
questioning.45
The unexpected twist to Sarah’s story is that in an
38. Richard Hartley-Parkinson, ‘I’m Going to Destroy American Dig Up
Marilyn Monroe’: British Pair Arrested in U.S. on Terror Charges Over
Twitter
Jokes,
DAILYMAIL.COM
(Jan.
31,
2012,
8:08
AM),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2093796/Emily-Bunting-Leigh-VanBryan-UK-tourists-arrested-destroy-America-Twitter-jokes.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Salma Abdelaziz, Teen Arrested for Tweeting Airline Terror Threat,
CNN (Apr. 14, 2014, 1:29 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/14/travel/dutchteen-arrest-american-airlines-terror-threat-tweet/.
43. Id.
44. Ben Mutzabaugh, Teen Girl Who Sent Terroristic Tweet To AA is
Arrested,
USA
TODAY
(Apr.
15,
2014,
12:32
PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/todayinthesky/2014/04/14/girl-sendsterroristic-tweet-to-aa-gets-unwanted-response/7694161/.
45. Id.
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apparent show of solidarity, dozens of teenagers tweeted bomb
“jokes” to American airlines, despite the risk of arrest.46 The
reactions to Sarah’s arrest highlighted the fact that despite the
increasing number social media-based arrests, either many still
do not understand the potential gravitas of their online
activity, or they are willing to risk arrest in an effort to protect
their freedom of speech online.
In the above stories, is the social media activity
insensitive? Yes. Crude? Most definitely. But criminal? This
article proposes a framework for this much-needed debate.
Although technically a public forum, social media sites have
become a place of primary communication for many Americans.
People, especially youth, feel comfortable sharing private
thoughts online because they are sharing them with their
Society’s
“friends,” not necessarily the world at large.47
expectation of privacy in its social media activity is important
to consider when deciding when to criminalize social media
thoughtcrimes.
These examples are important to keep in mind as such
cases are litigated and First Amendment parameters around
social media activity are defined. As it is the criminalization of
this form of speech — asinine, insensitive, tasteless, and oftenjuvenile social media activity, designed to be shared with
friends but is available to the world—that is relevant to this
article.
B. Why (Young) People Consider Public Speech Private
The relationship between Americans and social media is
46. Caitlin Dewey, Dozens of Teenagers Are Now Tweeting Bomb Jokes to
American
Airlines,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
14,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/style-blog/wp/2014/04/14/dozens-ofteenagers-are-now-tweeting-bomb-jokes-to-american-airlines/.
47. See Bobbie Johnson, Privacy No Longer a Social Norm, Says
Facebook Founder, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 10, 2010, 8:58 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/jan/11/facebook-privacy.
This
phenomenon has extended beyond thoughts, as a “sexting” culture has
emerged, where people are now sharing intimate pictures of themselves
through various online platforms. Gwen O’Keeffee & Kathleen ClarkePearson, The Impact of Social Media on Children, Adolescents, and Families,
127
AM .
ACAD.
OF
PEDIATRICS
800
(2011),
available
at
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/127/4/800.full.html.
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complicated. “In America, we live in a paradoxical world of
privacy.
On one hand, teenagers reveal their intimate
thoughts and behaviors online and, on the other hand,
government agencies and marketers are collecting personal
data about us.”48 However, it is not happenstance that people
are beginning to share the most intimate aspects of their lives,
including their thoughts, online. Social scientists have started
to develop the social psychology behind the way in which
people, especially young people, use social media, which should
be considered when deciding how to define the constitutional
boundaries around social media activity.
In many ways, social media has become part of human
identity. It provides a forum for people to shape their perfect
self — allowing them to portray to the world who they want it
to see.49 A person’s behavior on social media is not necessarily
an accurate reflection of self, but instead is an aggrandizement
based on who that person wants to be, or who she or he
believes those viewing the profile will find most attractive or
appealing.50 And while a person’s social media footprint may
not be an accurate reflection of who that person is, it is
becoming a necessary tool for identity formation. It is well
documented that an active social media presence is often seen
as necessary to engage with and belong to broader society;51 it
is important for the creation and maintenance of social
capital.52 For many, this public activity is a critical vehicle of
self-expression. It is important to remember when considering
whether it is permissible to criminalize social media activity,
that a person’s social media behavior is often an online
caricature.

48. Susan B. Barnes, A Privacy Paradox: Social Networking in the
United
States,
11
FIRST
MONDAY
9
(Sept.
4,
2006),
http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1394/1312.
49. See, e.g., id. (“[T]eenagers sometimes fabricate information to post on
these sites. Increasingly, many teenagers feel pressured to show themselves
doing more risqué things, even if they are not actually doing them” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
50. Id.
51. Nicole B. Ellison, et al., Negotiating Privacy Concerns and Social
Capital Needs in a Social Media Environment, in PRIVACY ONLINE 19, 21
(Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011).
52. Id. at 24.
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Social media is also increasingly important for identity
development. As one author put it, it is a safe place to conduct
adolescence.53 Millennials have substituted in-person
interaction with online communication, using the Internet as a
primary vehicle for communication.54 While adolescences and
teenagers previously made the mistakes of youth in private,
today, they often occur in a forum that someone is actively
monitoring.55 And replicating the natural maturation process,
there is evidence that young people do not make the same
misjudgments throughout their online lives; as people mature,
their social media habits evolve with them.56 Thus, the virtual
aspects of adolescence and its attendant misjudgments and
mistakes are necessary to consider when viewing social media
activity in the criminal context.
Finally, it is important to remember how people are using
social media at the most fundamental level. In an increasingly
globalized world, social media is integral to maintaining
relationships.57 Data suggests that a majority of people do not
use social media to interact with strangers, but instead, to stay
connected with people with whom a relationship had been
developed offline.58 Moreover, most do not use social media
networks haphazardly. People consciously consider who sees
what aspect of their online persona — carefully maintaining
privacy settings and deciding what information to share with
whom.59 That many people use social media to interact with
53. Sonia Livingstone, Taking Risky Opportunities in Youthful Content
Creation: Teenagers’ Use of Social Networking Sites for Intimacy, Privacy and
Self-Expression, 10 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 393, 396 (2008).
54. See id. at 404; see also Barnes, supra note 48.
55. See Barnes, supra note 48.
56. See generally Janna Q. Anderson & Lee Rainie, Millennials Will
Make Online Sharing in Networks a Lifelong Habit, PEW INTERNET & AM.
LIFE
PROJECT,
at
8-11
(2010),
available
at
http://www.pewinternet.org/files/oldmedia/Files/Reports/2010/PIP_Future_Of_Millennials.pdf.
57. See Patricia Reaney, Email Connects 85 Percent of the World; Social
Media Connects 62 Percent, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 27, 2012, 5:12 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/27/email-connects-theworld_n_1381854.html.
58. See Nicole Ellison, Charles Steinfield, & Cliff Lampe, The Benefits of
Facebook “Friends:” Social Capital and College Students’ Use of Online Social
Network Sites, 12 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMMC’N 1143, 1153-55 (2007).
59. See Mary Madden, Privacy Management on Social Media Sites, PEW
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real-life friends (as opposed to virtual friends), and think that
they have a modicum of control over the privacy of their
postings, helps explain why people share private thoughts
online, despite the fact that they are technically available to
the world at large.60
Though the stories of social media thoughtcrimes above
may seem ludicrous in isolation, in context, it is not without
reason why people share private thoughts online.61 And
although one can cast these examples off as extreme incidents
of government overreach or isolated examples of social media
misuse, where eventually the prosecution will be dropped or
the jury will nullify, it is not clear that social media’s current
trajectory will prove this the case. As social media becomes
ubiquitous, monitoring capabilities advance, and the fear of
terrorism intensifies, social media thoughtcrime arrests will
almost certainly continue to multiply in number. Therefore,
the general context of social media use, and its modern day
explosion is important to keep in mind when considering the
First Amendment protections of social media activity,
recognizing that prior First Amendment doctrines and
antiquated notions of private versus public fora may not neatly
fit the online arena.
III. Protection of Speech, or Lack Thereof
“There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem”62

INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, at 7 (2012), available at
http://www.pewinternet.org/files/oldmedia//Files/Reports/2012/PIP_Privacy_management_on_social_media_sites_
022412.pdf.
60. See Barnes, supra note 48.
61. In a study performed by Pew Research Center, only 9% of teen social
media users expressed high-level concern of third-party access to their data.
Mary Madden et al., Teens, Social Media, and Privacy, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER,
at
10
(May
21,
2013),
available
at
http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2013/Teens-Social-Media-And-Privacy.aspx.
62. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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While the First Amendment declares that Congress, and
by incorporation the states, shall make no laws abridging the
freedom of speech, the Supreme Court has made clear that free
speech protections are not absolute.63 What is also clear, at
least in theory, is that “[t]he First Amendment protects a wide
array of distasteful, disturbing, defamatory or factually false,
profane, ‘anti-American,’ and hateful speech.”64
States and the federal government tend to criminalize
speech intended to cause direct and imminent injury, which
courts often hold to be a permissible restriction on free
speech.65 Yet when it comes to proscribing unpopular speech,
the Supreme Court has tended to view such restraints with
intense skepticism, intimating that crass speech deserves just
as much protection, if not more, than other types of
To test First Amendment boundaries, the
expression.66
Supreme Court first looks at whether an activity constitutes
“speech;”67 and if it does, the Court then decides whether it
falls outside of constitutional protections.68
A. Online Activity Is Speech
For the purpose of social media postings, two categories of
63. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682-85 (1986);
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 479-88 (1957).
64. S. Cagle Juhan, Note, Free Speech, Hate Speech, and the Hostile
Speech Environment, 98 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1578 (2012). A recent case bears
this out. In United States v. Alvarez, the Court struck down the Stolen Valor
Act, which criminalized false statements concerning awards of military
honors. 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). Although the Justices could not reach a
consensus as to why the Stolen Valor Act violated the First Amendment –
four justices felt that falsity by itself is insufficient to justify criminal
prosecution, id. at 2547-48, while two Justices felt the objectives of the Stolen
Valor Act could have been achieved in a less-restrictive way. Id. at 2551
(Breyer, J., concurring). The fact remained that free speech triumphed and
lies were protected. For a discussion on Alvarez, see Rodney A. Smolla,
Categories, Tiers of Review, and the Rolling Sea of Free Speech Doctrine and
Principle: A Methodological Critique of United States v. Alvarez, 76 ALB. L.
REV. 499 (2012).
65. Susan Brenner, Criminalizing “Problematic” Speech Online, 11 J.
INTERNET L. 1, 1 (2007).
66. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992).
67. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).
68. See, e.g., id. at 406-08.
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speech are especially relevant. First, there is “pure speech,”
which consists of communicative thoughts or words that are
verbalized and/or written.69 This category of speech would
seemingly encompass Facebook statuses, tweets, and other
means by which users express their thoughts through writing,
because the Supreme Court made clear that acts “disclosing” or
“publishing” information constitutes “pure speech.”70 And in
case there was any doubt whether online activity is speech
protected by the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has
clearly held that online speech deserves the complete
protections of the First Amendment.71 Thus, although when
the Court first used the term “pure speech” it may not have
envisioned social media activity, such as tweeting, as conveying
“pure speech,” it ostensibly falls within the First Amendment
definition and is therefore deserving of the highest level of
constitutional protection.72
Then there is symbolic expression, which is also “speech”
for First Amendment purposes, and therefore privy to its
protections. To determine whether symbolic expression falls
under the First Amendment definition of “speech,” the
Supreme Court uses a two-part test, asking whether (1) there
is intent to convey a particularized message; and (2) there is a
great likelihood that those encountering the message would
understand it.73 First Amendment communicative expression
would appear to cover some instances of online picture
posting,74 sharing certain content or webpages,75 retweeting,
reposting other people’s thoughts, or even “liking” a Facebook
page or status.76 Thus, the First Amendment should protect, in
69. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 1529 (9th ed. 2009).
70. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526-27 (2001).
71. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
72. For a more detailed discussion of the various approaches courts take
to delimiting online speech, see Steven M. Puiszis, "Tinkering" With the First
Amendment's Protection of Student Speech on the Internet, 29 J. MARSHALL J.
OF COMPUTER & INFO. L. 167, 197-202 (2011).
73. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989); Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (per curiam).
74. See Puiszis, supra note 72, at 197.
75. Id.
76. See Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 384-87 (4th Cir. 2013); Ira P.
Robbins, What is the Meaning of “Like”: The First Amendment Implications of
Social Media Expression, 7 FED. CT. L. REV. 127, 145 (2013). There is also an

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/13

14

380

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35:1

theory, a wide array of social media activity unless it falls into
one of the limited predefined exceptions previously laid out by
the Supreme Court.
B. Current Exceptions to First Amendment Free Speech
Protections
Just because some social media usage falls within the First
Amendment definition of “speech” does not automatically
guarantee all social media activity has constitutional
protection. The Supreme Court has carved out certain types of
speech that do not fall within the ambit of First Amendment
safeguards. Categories of unprotected speech include: advocacy
intended and likely to incite imminent lawless action;77
obscenity;78 defamation;79 child pornography;80 “fighting
words”;81 fraud;82 true threats;83 speech integral to criminal
conduct;84 and speech presenting a grave and imminent threat
the government has the power to prevent.85 In the eyes of the
Supreme Court, this speech is undeserving of First
Amendment protections because “such utterances are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by social interest in
order and morality.”86
The examples of social media speech in Part I clearly do
not fit into most of the defined First Amendment exceptions.
Many of the categories, such as fraud and defamation, focus on
argument to be made that such expression constitutes pure speech under the
First Amendment. See id. at 144.
77. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
78. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
79. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
80. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
81. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
82. Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976).
83. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
84. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
85. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam);
Near v. Minn. ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
86. Chaplinksy, 315 U.S. at 572.

15

2014

SOCIAL MEDIA THOUGHT CRIMES

381

direct harm to an individual, which most would agree the
government has the power to proscribe. Other categories
center on expression that is so distasteful (an amorphous
standard), such as obscenity and pornography, that the activity
does not have the value of “speech” protected by the First
Amendment. No one would argue that the examples of social
media thoughtcrime contained herein fall outside of the First
Amendment’s grace because of these exceptions.
However, two categories of First Amendment exceptions
are especially salient for the purposes of the conversation:
imminent lawlessness and true threats, which are criminalized
based on public harm and criminal advocacy. However, while
in the abstract it may make sense to except threats and
criminal advocacy from First Amendment protections much in
the same way that inherently criminal speech is excepted, in
practice, as shown below, defining these exceptions has been
much harder to accomplish.
1. Imminent Lawlessness
In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Supreme Court struck new
ground by advancing the imminent lawlessness exception to
First Amendment speech protections.87 In Brandenburg, the
Court found that the First Amendment protects speechadvocating violence at a Ku Klux Klan rally.88 The Klan
members advocated returning the “nigger . . . to Africa, [and]
the Jew . . . to Israel[;]” and declared that “revengeance” may
be needed if the Supreme Court, Congress, and the President
continue to suppress “the white, Caucasian race.”89 Authorities
arrested the Klan members for violating Ohio’s criminal
syndicalism statute.90 The Court reversed, finding that the
First Amendment protected the Klan’s openly hostile speech,
and that the Ohio syndicalism statute is unconstitutional
because it punished “mere advocacy.”91 The Court explained,
“constitutional guarantees of free speech . . . do not permit a
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
Id. at 446, 448-49.
Id. at 447.
Id. at 444-45.
Id. at 448-49.
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State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action.”92 The Court drew a distinction between
advocating illegal acts versus “steeling” a group for violent
behavior.93
Recognizing that the concept of “imminence” is inherently
ambiguous, the Court attempted to clarify the imminent
lawlessness exception in Hess v. Indiana.94 Here, a student
protester faced arrest for statements made at a university
rally, where the sheriff overheard the protester saying, “We’ll
take the fucking street later” (or something to that effect). 95
The sheriff arrested the student for disorderly conduct, which
the student challenged on First Amendment grounds. The
State of Indiana defended the arrest by arguing the speech
incited imminent lawless action, and therefore was not
protected by the First Amendment.96 The Court disagreed,
clarifying that unless there is “evidence, or rational inference
from the import of the language, that his words were intended
to produce, and likely to produce, imminent disorder, those
words could not be punished by the State on the ground that
they had a tendency to lead to violence.”97 Hess leaves open the
natural follow-up question of how imminent is imminent.98
2. True Threats
The Supreme Court first articulated the true threats
doctrine in the 1969 case Watts v. United States.99 In Watts, a
young African-American man was protesting the draft by
participating in a public rally, and said: “They always holler at
92. Id. at 447 (footnote omitted).
93. Id. at 448.
94. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
95. Id. at 107.
96. Id. at 109.
97. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. It has not gone unnoticed how difficult it is to define “imminence,”
and how this difficultly is exacerbated in a time of terror. See, e.g., Robert S.
Tanenbaum, Preach Terror: Free Speech of Wartime Incitement, 55 AM. U. L.
REV. 785, 805 (2006).
99. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
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us to get an education. And now I have already received my
draft classification . . . I am not going. If they ever make me
carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is
L.B.J.”100 As a result of this public outcry, Watts was arrested
and charged with making criminal threats against the
President.101 Watts challenged his arrest, arguing he did not
intend to harm the President, stressing the context of the
speech and the fact that he made the statement in the course of
a political debate.102
The Court sided with Watts. Calling his speech “political
hyperbole,” the Court held that Watts’s speech did not
constitute a “true threat” removing it from First Amendment
protections, because: one, the comments were made
accompanying a political debate; two, the threats were
conditional in nature; and three, when putting the speech into
context, the listening audience did not perceive Watts’ words to
be threatening — in fact, many listeners laughed at Watts’
remarks.103 Context was essential to the Court when deciding
whether speech is a “true threat” allowing the government to
criminalize it. Still, although the Court found that Watts’
speech was not a true threat excepting it from the First
Amendment, the Court did little to explain what would be a
true threat, instead framing its holding in the negative.
In Virginia v. Black, a plurality of the Court attempted to
clarify the definition of a “true threat.”104 Writing for four
justices, Justice O’Connor explained that a true threat simply
requires a speaker to convey a threatening message to a wider
audience.105 To her, it did not matter whether the speaker
actually intended “to carry out the threat.
Rather, a
prohibition on true threats ‘protect[s] individuals from the fear
of violence’ and ‘from the disruption that fear engenders,’ in
addition to protecting people ‘from the possibility that the
threatened violence will occur.’”106
Under this broad
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 706.
Id. at 705-06.
Id. at 707.
Id. at 708.
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 344 (2003).
Id. at 359-60.
Id. at 360 (citations omitted).
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articulation of the true threat doctrine, it is arguable that the
broadcasting of a threatening message is enough to except the
message from First Amendment protections, regardless of the
intent of the speaker or the effect on the audience.
C. The Difficulty of Applying Present First Amendment
Exceptions to Social Media Thoughtcrime
It is relatively clear that the social media thoughtcrimes
described in Part I do not fall under most of the exceptions to
the First Amendment.107 It is murky, however, as to whether
the online activity is excepted from the First Amendment
under the true threats or imminent lawlessness doctrines, and
the answer will often turn on the identity of the decisionmaker. It is for these reasons that neither test provides an
adequate measure by which to judge whether the First
Amendment protects social media activity.
1. Brandenburg Does Not Work
While most view Brandenburg as a ringing endorsement of
free speech rights, it has left open more questions than it has
answered. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has done little to
resolve the questions left in the wake of Brandenburg,108 the
most glaring of which, is how to define imminence. While the
Court said in a future case, that if the unlawful activity
advocated is weeks or months down the road, it will likely not
be considered imminent, short of that, there are no clear
parameters.109 What is imminent, therefore, necessarily relies
on the discretion of the factfinder. And while most legal tests
rely on discretion to some degree, there needs to be clearer
guidelines when considering First Amendment rights in the
context of social media activity, as the everyday activities of the
vast majority of Americans are implicated.
The ambiguity of imminence is not the only fault of
107. See supra Part II.B for a list of exceptions to the First Amendment.
108. See Thomas Healy, Brandenburg in a Time of Terror, 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 655, 667-70 (2009).
109. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982).
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Brandenburg, however. There is a question if the Brandenburg
test is limited to speech that is “political advocacy,” or if it
applies to all speech. If Brandenburg is limited to political
advocacy, some social media thoughtcrimes may be judged
under the test and some might not. This also begs the
question, what exactly is political advocacy?
Does
Brandenburg only apply to speech that encourages others to
commit criminal acts in a show of political protest, or does it
apply when the individual speaker discusses their own
criminal proclivities in a political context or in relation to a
political event?110 Regardless, applying two separate tests to
generally similar conduct can lead to strange results, which is
unhelpful when free speech rights in the online context need to
be clearly defined.
There is also a question as to whether Brandenburg
applies to private acts, or if it is solely limited to public
speech.111 Some argue that speech must be communicated in a
public setting for Brandenburg to apply.112 The question of
whether Brandenburg is limited to public speech becomes even
further complicated when asked in the social media context, as
some social media users often think their activity is private,
when technically most activity is public in some sense.
Therefore, should the amount of protection social media
activities receive turn on a user’s privacy setting? Is online
speech truly private given the level of monitoring that occurs
by both public and private actors? These gray areas leave in
limbo quasi-private online acts and do not clearly explain how
Brandenburg applies to social media activity.
While Brandenburg was a useful step in the evolution of
freedom of speech, as it stands now, the imminent lawlessness
test applied in Brandenburg is hard to apply in the social
media context and may produce varying results. Because the
import and reach of Brandenburg is largely unsettled as it
110. See Healy, supra note 108, at 681.
111. Id.; see also Tenenbaum, supra note 98, at 817-18 (citing Herceg v.
Hustler Mag., 814 F.2d 1017, 2020-23 (5th Cir. 1987), where the court
implied that the state interest in regulating private speech is much less than
the state interest in regulating public speech).
112. See, e.g., O. Lee Reed, The State Is Strong but I Am Weak: Why the
“Imminent Lawless Action” Standard Should Not Apply to Targeted Speech
That Threatens Individuals with Violence, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 177 (2000).
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presently stands, it is an ineffective means to regulate online
speech and test its validity under the First Amendment.
2. The True Threats Doctrine Is Unwieldy
The Supreme Court has never given an adequate definition
of what constitutes a true threat, and its one attempt to
provide clarity further obfuscated the issue. As such, there is a
fracas in the lower courts applying the true threats doctrine,
with all forms of tests emerging when applying the amorphous
First Amendment exception.113 The uncertainty shrouding the
true threats doctrine is evidenced by the fact that there is even
a question if the true threats doctrine is a standalone test, or
merely a refinement or subpart of the test announced in
Brandenburg. 114
Courts are divided as to whether there needs to be
identifiable targets of the threats, or if a general threat is
enough to except speech from the First Amendment.115 Some
courts have interpreted Justice O’Connor’s definition of true
threats to subsume every threat made in public, regardless of
the intent of the speaker.116 Others believe the true threats
definition used in Black requires intent on the part of the
speaker — that the speaker must have intended to carry out
the threat that she or he publically conveyed; yet whether this
is a subjective or objective standard of intent divides the
courts.117 Again, the ambiguities raise challenging questions in
the social media context, and may yield different results
depending on the arbiter.118
113. See Paul T. Crane, “True Threats” and the Issue of Intent, 92 VA. L.
REV. 1225, 1265-69 (2006); Steven G. Gey, Cross Burning, Intimidation, and
Free Speech, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1326-27, 1331-33 (2005).
114. See Gey, supra note 113, at 1331.
115. Id. at 1332-33.
116. See, e.g., Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 616-17
(5th Cir. 2004).
117. Crane, supra note 113, at 1261-69 (discussing various cases
applying subjective or objective intent requirements).
118. The Supreme Court has recently heard argument on the application
of the true threats doctrine to the social media context. See Elonis v. United
States, No. 13-983 (U.S. argued Dec. 1, 2014). The case involves threats the
petitioner made against his wife over Facebook - he was arrested for violating
18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012), which prohibits the transmission of threats in
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Some scholars have suggested that Black’s true threats
doctrine is inapplicable to private speech.119 Their reasoning is
that privately communicated threats receive little or no
protection under the First Amendment, and that the true
threats inquiry is therefore irrelevant to threats made in
private.120 However, this raises questions as to how to define
publically-communicated
threats
versus
privatelycommunicated threats. Should it depend on the number of
views a post receives, whether only a social media user’s
“friends” can view the threat, or does it depend on how many
“friends” a social media user has? Alternatively, are social
media posts punishable when the public at large can view
them? If someone intended to convey a private threat online, is
it no longer private because of the inherent lack of privacy on
social media networks?
Applying the concept of a “true threat” to the online sphere
is like trying to fit a round peg in a square hole. Very little of
what is conveyed online is accurate, and much online speech is
flat-out false, even when people are portending to portray their
personal life. The concept of “truth” is fleeting online, and
therefore, the true threats doctrine is dangerous to apply given
the context.
Like Brandenburg, there are too many questions presently
left open by Black for the true threats doctrine to be useful in
defining whether social media activity should be protected or
not. As explained in the next section, it is time to move away
from the current First Amendment exceptions when deciding
whether social media activity is punishable. There should be
one question based on established Supreme Court precedent
that authorities and courts should ask when deciding whether
the First Amendment protects social media speech: Does the
social media activity create a clear and present danger? If not,
the First Amendment protects it.
IV. Protecting Online Speech - A Return to Simpler Times

interstate commerce. United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 2013).
119. Gey, supra note 113, at 1350.
120. See Reed, supra note 112, at 206-07.
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It is important to define the line between online speech
and criminal activity as social media becomes an indispensable
part of basic human expression; “What is a threat must be
distinguished from what is constitutionally protected.”121 Most
would agree that arrest and prosecution for social media
thoughtcrimes is a waste of scarce resources, unnecessarily
involving young people in the criminal justice system.122
Conversely, many would argue that we should not tie the
hands of law enforcement, and that policing online activity is a
valid method of ferreting out nefarious actors.123 Given this
tension, when attempting to understand how social media
should be used vis-à-vis the criminal justice system, law
enforcement, prosecutors, and the public need a simple
directive to guide the criminalization of online speech. Luckily,
the Supreme Court, through First Amendment maverick
Justice Holmes, announced a First Amendment test, the clear
and present danger test, that with some refinement may
provide the necessary answer to the First Amendment online
speech conundrum.
A. The Development of Clear and Present Danger
The Supreme Court was at best apathetic and at worst
openly hostile to the idea of free speech up until the early
1900s. Then, with Justice Brandeis at his side, Justice Holmes
began to forge a new path in First Amendment jurisprudence,

121. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969).
122. If nothing but anecdotal evidence, the public reactions to the stories
outlined in Part I, including the petition for Justin Carter, and the grand
jury’s failure to indict Cameron D’Ambrosio, show that the public in some
regard does not think that this form of speech should be criminally
sanctioned.
123. For example, Boston Marathon bombing suspect Tamerlan
Tsarnaev allegedly posted a number of radical jihadist videos on YouTube,
leaving people to wonder why his social media activity did not raise red flags
and prompt further investigation.
See David W. Kearn, The Boston
Marathon Bombing One Year Later: What We Still Don’t Know, HUFFINGTON
POST (Apr. 25, 2014, 5:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-wkearn/the-boston-marathon-bombi_2_b_5213398.html; Tim Lister & Paul
Cruickshank, Dead Boston bomb suspect posted video of jihadist, analysis
shows,
CNN
(Apr.
22,
2013,
11:13
AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/20/us/brother-religious-language/.
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with many crediting the duo for the free speech protections we
have today.124 In a 1919 trio of cases, Justice Holmes wrote
three First Amendment opinions for a unanimous Court.125
Although the Court decided all three cases against the person
claiming free speech protections, one case in particular stands
out for its rhetorical endorsement of the First Amendment.
In Schenck v. United States, Charles Schenck, a popular
socialist, was arrested for distributing flyers to American
service members that asserted the draft was the equivalent of
involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth
Amendment.126 For his actions, authorities charged Schenck
with violating the Espionage Act, as he was conspiring “to
cause insubordination.”127 Before the Supreme Court, Schenck
argued his arrest violated his First Amendment rights, but the
Court, through Justice Holmes, affirmed his conviction.128 In
finding that the arrest and conviction did not infringe upon
Schenck’s First Amendment rights, Holmes first used the
language of clear and present danger, saying:
The question in every case is whether the words
used are used in such circumstances and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a
question of proximity and degree.129
Holmes provided a pragmatic test relying on imminence and
context, because “the character of every act depends upon the
124. It has been hypothesized that Justice Holmes’ clear and present
danger standard was inspired in part by his relationship with Judge Learned
Hand, who had announced a similar incitement test for advocacy of criminal
activity. Masses Pub. Co v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). See Thomas
Healy, The Justice Who Changed His Mind: Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and
the Story Behind Abrams v. United States, 39 J. SUP. CT. HISTORY 35, 70
(2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2384855.
125. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Frohwerk v.
United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Deb v. United States, 249 U.S. 211
(1919).
126. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 50-51.
127. Id. at 48-49.
128. Id. at 52-53.
129. Id. at 52.
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circumstances in which it is done.”130
Funnily, Holmes did not mention the clear and present
danger test in the other two cases unanimously decided that
term. Instead, he summarily affirmed the convictions in the
face of First Amendment challenges, leading some to wonder
whether the seemingly righteous endorsement of speech used
in Schenck was accidental drafting or incidental lip service.131
In practice, Holmes and the Court seemed to side effortlessly
with the government’s attempts to criminalize speech.
Then, Holmes disabused any notion that he was not a free
speech champion with his dissent later that year in Abrams v.
United States.132 The facts of Abrams were not all that
dissimilar from Schenck; the Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction of a man charged under the Espionage Act for
distributing pamphlets with anti-war sentiments.133 However,
writing for himself and Justice Brandeis, Justice Holmes
dissented. Reviving the clear and present danger test, Justice
Holmes found the behavior here was protected by the First
Amendment.134 He clarified that the clear and present danger
test relies on criminal common law principles of attempt, in
that for criminal advocacy to fall outside of the reach of the
First Amendment, the speaker must intend to commit or have
result the crime advocated, and take some act in furtherance of
that intent.135 As such, he notes that a person cannot be
arrested for speech expressing criminal advocacy if the
criminal act itself is preconditioned on the acts of others.136
Justice Holmes “Great Dissent” in Abrams provided the
platform for modern First Amendment jurisprudence, and
forms the basis for the present understanding of free speech
protections.137
130. Id.
131. See Healy, supra note 124, at 55-75.
132. For an interesting discussion on Holmes’ evolution, see Healy,
supra note 124; David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First
Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1205, 1303-22 (1983).
133. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 617 (1919).
134. See id. at 624-31 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
136. Id.
137. See THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT - HOW OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES CHANGED HIS MIND - AND CHANGED THE HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN
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In his dissent in Abrams, Justice Holmes cited one of his
own opinions in which he explained the concept of criminal
attempt, in Swift & Co. v. United States.138 In Swift, Justice
Holmes clearly laid out what was necessary for criminal
attempt, proclaiming: “Where acts alone are not sufficient in
themselves to produce a result which the law seeks to prevent .
. . but require further acts . . . to bring that result to pass, an
intent to bring it to pass is necessary to produce a dangerous
probability that it will happen.”139 Justice Holmes went on to
say, “[n]ot every act that may be done with intent to produce an
unlawful result is unlawful, or constitutes an attempt.”140
Using the same language that he used in Schenck, Holmes
reminded that it is still always going to be “. . .a question of
proximity and degree.”141 It was the “well known” criminal law
doctrine of attempt as articulated in Swift, that Justice Holmes
believed should guide the clear and present danger First
Amendment test.142
Then, to solidify his place in First Amendment
jurisprudence, Justice Holmes dissented once again with
Justice Brandeis in Gitlow v. New York.143 In arguing that the
prosecution of the petitioner under a state criminal anarchy
statute for publishing and distributing various socialist
pamphlets violated the First Amendment, Justice Holmes
wrote this now famous passage:
Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for
belief and if believed it is acted on unless some
other belief outweighs it or some failure of
energy stifles the movement at its birth. The only
difference between the expression of an opinion
and an incitement in the narrower sense is the
speaker’s enthusiasm for the result. Eloquence
may set fire to reason. But whatever may be
AMERICA (Metropolitan Book 2013).
138. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
139. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905).
140. Id. at 402.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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thought of the redundant discourse before us it
had no chance of starting a present
conflagration. If in the long run the beliefs
expressed in proletarian dictatorship are
destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of
the community, the only meaning of free speech
is that they should be given their chance and
have their way.144
As explained below, it is Justice Holmes’ articulation of the
clear and present danger standard in Schenck, constructed on
the foundation of Swift and elaborated upon in Abrams and
Gitlow, that should be the standard by which social media
speech is considered for First Amendment purposes.

B. Online Speech Should Be Judged by the Clear and Present
Danger Test
The issues surrounding social media are so complex that
the relative simplicity of the clear and present danger test,
grounded in the well-aged principles of criminal attempt, would
be helpful when deciding whether social media activity is
constitutionally protected.145
144. Id. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
145. This is not to say clear and present danger test does not have
critics. However, many of the test’s critiques have centered on how it has
been applied (or not applied) by the courts rather than the test itself. See,
e.g., David Feister, How Clear Is the Clear and Present Danger Test, 1 GROVE
CITY C. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 39 (2010). Other critiques have focused on the fact
that the clear and present danger test protects too little speech, advocating
for a near-absolutist interpretation of the First Amendment. See David R.
Dow, The Moral Failure of the Clear and Present Danger Test, 6 WM. & MARY
BILL OF RTS. J. 733 (1998); David R. Dow & R. Scott Schieldes, Rethinking the
Clear and Present Danger Test, 73 IND. L. J. 1217 (1998). Finally, there is a
question as to how the clear and present danger test is related to
Brandenburg and Watts, and whether the imminent lawless action test is a
refinement of the clear and present danger standard, or a departure. See
Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment:
In Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1159, 1175 (1982);
Hans A. Linde, “Clear and Present Danger” Reexamined: Dissonance in the
Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (1970). However, whether
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There is a multitude of benefits of applying the clear and
present danger test as announced in Schenck and clarified in
Abrams and Gitlow to social media speech. The clear and
present danger test has the imminence component that makes
Brandenburg speech protective, and is especially salient in the
online context.146 The imminence component is borne in part
from the idea that if the criminal act is not imminent, a gooddoer has time to intercede, or the speaker has time to change
her mind.147 This idea is magnified ten-fold in the social media
context, as it is a medium of communication designed for
immediate response. Therefore, if a person truly thought the
teenager in Chicago was going to shoot up his neighborhood if
the jury eventually found George Zimmerman not guilty,
someone would have certainly had the chance to respond and
intercede, telling him that even if he was serious, that there
are better ways he can express his frustrations. Requiring
there to be imminent danger ensures social media users who
publish online threats have a chance to recognize their
foolishness and retract their statement, or be persuaded to
change their mind prior to risking arrest.
In a similar vein, the clear and present danger test draws
from criminal law and looks at the motive of the speaker and
whether he or she had actual criminal intent, and then
whether the speaker took some action in furtherance of that
intent. And this will often require more than just an online
posting, which is so easy to do with very little thought, and will
necessitate some further corroboration of the user’s intent.
Further, in line with general principles of criminal attempt,
there will also have to be proof of some action in furtherance of
the crime discussed via social media to warrant arrest and
allow conviction.
Before social media thoughtcrime is
punishable, the government would have to show that the social
media user actually intended to commit a crime and has the
ability to do so.
Brandenburg and Watts represent a refinement of the clear and present
danger test, a departure, or a strange permutation, the tests as explained
herein are largely unworkable in the online context.
146. In fact, Justice Holmes actually uses the word imminence in his
Abrams dissent in place of “present” when describing the standard. See
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
147. See Gey, supra note 113, at 706.
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Another attractive aspect of the clear and present danger
test is that it takes into account the context of speech and the
audience receiving it. People say things online that they would
never say in person, because for many, social media is a way to
aggrandize in a setting with limited repercussions. This
context is crucial when deciding whether speech constitutes a
clear and present danger — when there is just social media
activity with nothing more, the answer is likely it does not.
Intimate conversations that were had in the living room in
front of the television, at the neighborhood bar, or on
playground are taking place on social media platforms.
Therefore, treating social media speech in the same manner as
speech shouted at public rallies or mass-distributed pamphlets
is in many was nonsensical. However, criminalizing social
media activity that creates imminent danger has applicability
that is more sensible, with the understanding that words alone
rarely can constitute a significant enough threat to remove the
speech from the protections of the First Amendment.148
In situations where an online speaker does intend to
threaten his audience on a social media network and the threat
is seemingly imminent, the next step would be to put the threat
in context, and determine whether the person who is viewing
the threat would perceive it as such. In other words, did the
person with whom the speaker was communicating feel
immediately threatened by the post. In that case, similar to
the common law principles of assault, perhaps the speech can
be criminalized, because the speech “. . .operates more like a
physical action than a verbal or symbolic communication of
ideas or emotions.”149 But there should also be an objective
analysis as to whether it was reasonable for the person to feel
threatened given the surrounding context.150
Some may posit that posting criminal thoughts or threats
in the public sphere is enough to warrant the exemption of
148. See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 327 (1957) (“Instances of
speech that could be considered to amount to ‘advocacy of action' are [] few
and far between.”).
149. Steven G. Gey, The Nuremberg Files and The First Amendment
Value of Threats, 78 TEX. L. REV. 541, 593 (2000).
150. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) (describing the clear and present danger test as requiring both
reasonable fear of injury, and that the danger apprehended be imminent).
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speech from the First Amendment given the harm that can
result. This argument is based on the fear that such speech
engenders and the panic it can cause. 151 While the argument
is well taken, the threatening, bullying, and violent language
used regularly online undermines this argument. If threats
online, in whatever form, can be criminalized, the slippery
slope is actually a vertical line. Moreover, there is a difference
between making threats with people in close physical
proximity, and posting threats in an online forum where the
speaker may be continents away. Taking the classic example
used by Justice Holmes, shouting “fire” in a crowded theater is
unlikely to have the same effect in a popular chatroom.152 And
in the instances that it does have a similar effect, where social
media activity does create mass hysteria, in that case perhaps
abrogation of free speech rights is necessary.153
Another counterargument this proposed solution is likely
to face is that it essentially requires law enforcement to wait
until the crime is near completion, which, as seen in countless
examples in a Post-9/11 world, could have disastrous
consequences. My thesis, however, does not reach government
monitoring of social media — although there are certainly
constitutional issues that abound as a result of such programs.
It also does not prevent law enforcement from using social
media as a tool for further investigation — there may very well
be instances where a social media post can give rise to
reasonable suspicion, allowing limited law enforcement
interaction, that social media activity can “counsel” further
investigation.154 My argument is simply stating that it should
be rare a case where a person’s speech through a social media

151. See Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25
HARV. J. L. PUB. POL’Y 283, 291 (2001).
152. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The most
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man falsely shouting
fire in a theatre and causing panic.”).
153. I am sure some would argue that the hypothesis outlined herein is
not protective enough. See, e.g., supra note 145. However, this article rests
on the assumption that there will not be a tectonic shift in First Amendment
jurisprudence in the near future, and therefore works with the precedent
presently on the books.
154. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1696 (2014) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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outlet results in arrest and prosecution.155 And in deciding
whether social media speech can be criminalized, or whether
the First Amendment protects it, with protection of speech
serving as the default, the clear and present danger test can
serve as a commonsense guide for government officials.
Although not necessarily one’s first impulse, returning to
nearly century-old precedent and defining 21st century online
speech protections in accordance with criminal law is internally
consistent; harmonizing speech advocating criminal acts with
common law attempt principles makes sense. The concept of a
“clear and present danger” is something that the average
person can conceptualize and think about as he or she engages
in online social media activity, and it is something police and
prosecutors can latch onto when deciding whether further
action is warranted. It refocuses the protections of speech with
an eye as to what is criminal versus what is socially acceptable
in a way that the average person can understand.
V.

Conclusion

Some may argue that social media thoughtcrime deserves
no protection as it adds no value to the marketplace, and after
all, the First Amendment protects speech for its value to
society.156
Although this First Amendment concept is
important, it is just as important to remember that the First
Amendment was also designed to protect an individual’s right
of expression.157 Moreover, some of the speech exampled above
does add to the value of the marketplace of ideas and
democracy in its own way. Yes, at first blush the examples
seem to consist solely of silly posts made by reckless young
people with no larger value. However, each post has its own
place within larger social discourse. For example, while Justin

155. See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 327 (1957).
156. See Healy, supra note 108, at 700.
157. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (“[The Framers] valued liberty both as an end and as a means.
They believed liberty to be the secret to happiness and courage to be the
secret of liberty.”); Steven J. Heyman, The Dark Side of the Force: The Legacy
of Justice Holmes for First Amendment Jurisprudence, 19 WM. & MARY BILL
OF RIGHTS J. 661, 699-700 (2011).
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Carter may have been joking (allegedly) about shooting up a
school — in his own way he was highlighting the absurdity and
the inhumanity of the Sandy Hook shootings. The Chicago
teenager reacting to the Zimmerman trial was adding his
commentary to a salient social-political issue in which almost
all of America was engaged. While Sarah the Dutch teenager
may have been pulling an online prank when tweeting about
placing a bomb on an American Airlines plane, those who
tweeted similar sentiments after her were doing so in a
seeming show of subversive solidarity, protesting her arrest.
Finally, the British youths that were arrested for using popular
slang is just further evidence of a transatlantic and crossgenerational communication divide that has always existed.
While it is easy to write off social media speech as
valueless, and therefore undeserving of First Amendment
protections, this entire article is premised on the fact that there
is value to be had by allowing people to express themselves via
social media. That social media expression is often a method of
engaging in larger social dialogue regardless of how crude the
expression might be. And even when social media activity is
not contributing to a larger social dialogue, social media is an
important tool of self-expression. It is a primary means of
communication for people around the world, supplanting
speech that was previously conducted in private that people
would not dream of criminalizing. Finally, it is critical to
remember that freedom of speech is the baseline, and as the
Internet becomes even more deeply entrenched in the human
experience, the vigorous protection of online speech, including
social media speech, will be of paramount importance.
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